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The Moral from Sorrell:  
Educate, Don’t Legislate 
George R. Gooch,† J. James Rohack††  
& Marisa Finley††† 
Abstract 
This Article argues that in response to the United States Supreme 
Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., state legislators should 
refrain from enacting prescription confidentiality laws and instead  
implement policies supporting academic detailing, a form of continuing 
medical education in which trained health professionals such as physicians, 
registered nurses, advanced practice nurses, and pharmacists provide 
evidence-based information about prescription drugs to prescribers.  
According to Sorrell, pharmaceutical companies may freely use  
physicians’ prescribing data to better promote, or “detail,” products to 
physicians without government interference. While pharmaceutical 
companies may profit from detailing drugs to physicians, detailing 
increases health care costs for patients and negatively affects patient 
health outcomes. These problems motivated Maine, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont to enact prescription confidentiality laws that banned the use 
of information about the prescribing habits of physicians to help market 
drugs to physicians. 
Recent state attempts to stop drug detailing to physicians have been 
found to violate the First Amendment. This Article provides a history 
and background on the pharmaceutical-detailing process and analyzes 
recent legal decisions relating to prescription confidentiality. It concludes 
that academic detailing is a viable solution to the negative effects of 
pharmaceutical detailing and is consistent with the First Amendment. 
 
Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................................. 238 
I. History and Background ....................................................................... 243 
 
† J.D., Texas Wesleyan School of Law; LL.M., University of Houston Law 
Center. The primary author was supported by a grant from the William R. 
Courtney Centennial Endowed Chair in Medical Humanities at Scott  
& White/Texas A&M Health Science Center. 
†† Director, Center for Healthcare Policy, Scott & White Healthcare; William 
R. Courtney Centennial Endowed Chair in Medical Humanities at Scott  
& White/Texas A&M Health Science Center. M.D., University of Texas 
Medical Branch at Galveston; F.A.C.C., F.A.C.P. 
††† Associate Director, Center for Healthcare Policy, Scott & White 
Healthcare. J.D., University of Arkansas School of Law; LL.M., University of 
Houston Health Law & Policy Institute.  
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013  
The Moral from Sorrell 
238 
A.  The History of Drug Detailing............................................................. 243 
B.  Physician Resistance to Pharmaceutical Detailing and the  
American Medical Association’s Response ........................................ 244 
C.  Pharmaceutical Detailing Today ......................................................... 246 
II. IMS Health Inc. Litigation in the First Circuit ........................... 248 
A.  Some Clarification on Parties to the IMS Health Inc. Cases .............. 248 
B.  New Hampshire’s Prescription Confidentiality Law ............................ 249 
C.  Maine’s Prescription Confidentiality Law ........................................... 250 
D.  The First Circuit’s Decision in the IMS Health Cases ........................ 251 
III.  Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law  and the 
Supreme Court’s Decision in  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. ..... 252 
A.  How Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law Differs from 
Maine and New Hampshire’s Laws .................................................... 252 
B.  Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law in the Lower Courts ...... 254 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Decision ............................................................ 255 
D.  “Heightened” Judicial Scrutiny and the First Amendment .................. 256 
E.  Protecting Physician Privacy under Heightened Scrutiny ................... 256 
F.  Containing Prescription Drug Costs under Heightened Scrutiny ........ 257 
G.  Promoting Public Health under Heightened Scrutiny .......................... 258 
H.  The Majority Provides Some Guidance ............................................... 258 
IV. Government Responses to Pharmaceutical  Detailing .............. 259 
A.  Enacting Legislation Banning the Use of Prescriber-Identifying 
Data Will Likely Fail Under the First Amendment ........................... 259 
B.  Giving Physicians More Privacy Options Is Irrelevant to the 
Courts ................................................................................................ 261 
C.  Telling Physicians to Close Their Doors Will Not Solve Anything ..... 262 
V. Academic Detailing Is the Best Response  to Sorrell ................ 263 
A.  What Is Academic Detailing? .............................................................. 263 
B.  Federal Initiatives for Academic Detailing Programs ......................... 266 
C.  Legal Advantages of Academic Detailing............................................. 266 
D.  Protecting Physician Privacy with Academic Detailing and the 
PDRP ................................................................................................ 267 
E.  Reducing Prescription Drug Costs with Academic Detailing .............. 268 
F.  Academic Detailing Programs’ Costs Weighed against Profits ........... 270 
G.  Promoting Public Health with Academic Detailing.............................. 274 
H.  Prescriber-Identifying Data Can Improve Academic Detailing ........... 276 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 277 
Introduction 
Physicians often work upwards of eighty hours each week.1 Between 
seeing patients, filling out paperwork, and managing a practice, physi-
cians have little time to research the drugs they prescribe. Although 
 
1. Shirley S. Wang, New Rx for Young Doctors: Shorter Work Day,  
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703900004575325130511028968.html. 
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physicians can seek drug information from any number of sources—
including colleagues, journal articles and advertisements, direct mail, 
commercial sources, Medicare updates, conferences, and continuing 
medical education activities2—they rely on information from pharmaceu-
tical sales representatives (drug reps).3 Drugs reps are mindful of 
physicians’ limited time and offer them succinct drug information.4 This 
direct-to-physician marketing is hugely successful; indeed, it is a highly 
profitable form of advertising for drug companies.5 While research shows 
that physicians understand the conflict of interest between marketing 
and patient care, they nevertheless frequently communicate with drug 
reps.6 In 2005, the average primary care physician interacted with 
twenty-eight drug reps each week; the average specialist interacted with 
fourteen.7  
Drug reps promote their products to physicians in offices and  
hospitals through a process called detailing. Detailing is a marketing 
technique used to educate physicians about a pharmaceutical company’s 
products in hopes that physicians will prescribe them more.8 Drug reps, 
also known as detailers, bring physicians drug samples and medical 
studies explaining the advantages of their company’s products.9  
Detailers can market a particular drug more effectively when they 
have information about doctors’ unique prescribing practices, or  
“prescriber-identifying data.” Using prescriber-identifying data, detailers 
can target physicians who adopt new drugs quickly, regularly prescribe 
competitors’ drugs, or prescribe large quantities of drugs for particular 
 
2. Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-
Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative 
Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 785, 797 (2005). 
3. See Pew Prescription Project & Community Catalyst, Academic Detailing: 
Evidence-Based Prescribing Information, COMMUNITY CATALYST 1 (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.communitycatalyst.org/ 
doc_store/publications/Academic_Detailing_Fact_Sheet.pdf [hereinafter 
Prescription Project] (describing the amount of resources the 
pharmaceutical industry expends on soliciting).  
4. See Jerry Avorn, Academic Detailing: An Introduction, NAT’L RES. CTR. 
FOR ACAD. DETAILING 9 (2011), http://www.narcad.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Avorn-AD-talk-for-web-1-15-2011.pdf. 
5. J. A. Greene, Pharmaceutical Marketing Research and the Prescribing 
Physician, 10 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 744 (2007) (describing the 
history of data mining from its origins in the mid-twentieth century). 
6. Prescription Project, supra note 3, at 1. 
7. Rayna Herman & Ashley Mahoney, 2005 Access Report: The Current 
State of Pharma Sales, PHARMACEUTICAL REPRESENTATIVE, July 1, 2005, 
at 16.  
8. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). 
9. Id. 
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conditions.10 Because detailing is an expensive process, pharmaceutical 
companies typically use it to promote expensive brand-name, patent-
protected drugs.11 Once a brand-name drug’s patent expires, cheaper, 
generic alternatives are manufactured and sold.12 Because of their lower 
profit margins, generic drugs are not marketed by drug reps.13  
Pursuant to federal law, pharmacies receive prescriber-identifying 
data when processing prescriptions.14 Several pharmacies sell this 
information to data miners, also known as health information  
organizations (HIOs) or prescription drug intermediaries (PDIs). HIOs 
and PDIs are firms that analyze prescriber-identifying data to create 
reports on prescriber behavior.15 The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) mandates that this prescriber-identifying 
data contain no patient identifiers such as names, addresses, and social 
security numbers.16 Some integrated health care organizations such as 
Kaiser Permanente restrict use of prescription data because they object 
to influencing prescribing patterns to promote more costly, brand-name 
drugs when cheaper generics are often equally effective.17 Only a small 
fraction of pharmacies, however, restrict the use of prescriber data.18  
HIOs combine the prescription information from pharmacies with 
physicians’ demographic, practice, and contact information from the 
American Medical Association’s (AMA) Masterfile to create reports on 
physician prescribing patterns.19 HIOs lease these reports, subject to 
nondisclosure agreements, to pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical 
researchers, and government agencies.20 “Detailers, who represent drug 
 
10. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
11. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 2662. 
14. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(2) (2006). 
15. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. 
16. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
17. Robert Steinbrook, For Sale: Physicians’ Prescribing Data, 354 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 2745, 2747 (2006). 
18. Id. 
19. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of 
Prescribing Data for Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 
(2011). 
20. Robert A. Musacchio & Robert J. Hunkler, More Than a Game of Keep 
Away, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE (May 1, 2006), http://pharmexec. 
findpharma.com/pharmexec/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=323311. 
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manufacturers, then use these reports to refine their marketing tactics 
and increase [pharmaceutical] sales.”21  
Some physicians welcome detailers, claiming that detailers provide 
them with studies relevant to their practices, useful free drug samples, 
and targeted data about the prescribing patterns of other physicians.22 
Generally, these physicians claim they are immune to detailers’ influence 
and see no conflicts of interest.23 Other physicians, however, object that 
detailing intrudes into their prescribing decisions.24 These physicians 
insist that detailers should be restricted from using their prescribing 
patterns for direct-to-physician marketing purposes.25  
Studies show that detailing influences requests to add brand-name 
medications to hospitals’ formularies, thus increasing prescribing costs 
that add to the burgeoning cost of health care in the United States.26 In 
2010, health-care expenditures in the United States surpassed 
$2.5 trillion, more than three times the $724 billion spent in 1990 and 
eight times the $255 billion spent in 1980.27 Prescription drugs account 
for about ten percent of these increasing costs.28 Between 2002 and 2005, 
the pharmaceutical industry spent $7 billion annually detailing brand-
name drugs to physicians.29 Aggressive marketing campaigns by large 
drug companies and the billions spent in direct-to-consumer drug 
 
21. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660 (2011). 
22. For those physicians who do not welcome detailers, the AMA offers 
physicians the ability to withhold prescribing data from drug 
representatives while still making it available for medical research. AMA 
Program Offers Physicians a Choice When It Comes to Prescribing Data: 
Q&A with Jeremy Lazarus, AMA, http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/dbl-public/pdrp-qa-final.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 
2013) [hereinafter AMA Program]. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Fadi M. Alkhateeb & William R. Doucette, Electronic Detailing (E-
detailing) of Pharmaceuticals to Physicians: A Review, 2 INT’L J. 
PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTHCARE MARKETING 235, 236 (2008).  
27. OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., TABLE 
1: NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES; AGGREGATE AND PER CAPITA 
AMOUNTS, ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE AND PERCENT DISTRIBUTION: 
SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1960-2011 (2011),  
available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/ 
downloads/tables.pdf.  
28. Id. at TABLE 4. 
29. Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 676 (2007). 
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advertising lead to increased drug costs that are passed along to  
patients.30 
Detailing can also adversely affect health outcomes. Although the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires pharmaceutical companies 
to engage in extensive drug testing to ensure that drugs are both safe and 
effective,31 a drug’s long-term effects are sometimes unknown until the 
drug has been on the market for several years.32 When detailers market to 
“early adopters,” i.e., physicians who prescribe new drugs earlier than 
other physicians,33 the number of patients taking a drug with potentially 
unknown side effects increases.34 
In response to these concerns, some states have enacted legislation 
banning the use of prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes,35 
and at least twenty-five other states have considered similar legislation.36 
Implementation of these statutes has been unsuccessful, however, with 
the most recent blow coming from a 6–3 Supreme Court decision, Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc., ruling that a Vermont law banning the use of 
prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes violated the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.37  
Rather than banning the use of prescriber-identifying data, other 
states have incorporated detailing programs of their own to balance the 
information physicians receive from the pharmaceutical industry.38 This 
practice is known as academic detailing, “a form of continuing medical 
education in which a trained health professional such as a physician or 
pharmacist visits physicians in their offices to provide evidence-based 
information.”39  
 
30. See Prescription Project, supra note 3. 
31. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (d) (2006). 
32. See Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug 
Approval Process, 14 J. AM. BD. FAM. PRAC. 362, 366 (2001). 
33. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
34. See id. at 85. 
35. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,  
§ 1711-E-2-A (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009), invalidated 
by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).  
36. Brief for Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8, Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 771332. 
37. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011). 
38. Telephone Interview with Michael Fischer, Program Dir., Nat’l Res. Ctr. 
for Acad. Detailing (Sept. 23, 2011). 
39. Michael Allen et al., Family Physicians’ Perceptions of Academic 
Detailing: A Quantitative and Qualitative Study, 7 BMC MED. EDUC., Oct. 
12, 2007, at 2, available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/ 
content/pdf/1472-6920-7-36.pdf. 
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In the wake of Sorrell, with patients’ health and wallets hanging in 
the balance, what is the right solution to this problem? Should states 
continue attempts to enact legislation carved around Sorrell that ban 
the use of prescriber-identifying data? Should states go so far as to 
regulate the practice of detailing itself? Or should states counterbalance 
commercial detailing with academic-detailing programs? 
This Article argues that state legislators should implement policies 
supporting academic-detailing programs. Part I of this Article provides a 
history and background of the pharmaceutical-detailing process. Part II 
analyzes the First Circuit’s holding regarding prescription confidentiality 
laws in Maine and New Hampshire. Part III examines the holdings in the 
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court in Sorrell. Part IV analyzes 
responses to pharmaceutical detailing. Part V examines the use of 
academic detailing to respond to the negative effects of pharmaceutical 
detailing and concludes that state legislators should implement policies 
that support academic-detailing programs. 
I. History and Background 
Pharmaceutical drug detailing has evolved with the use of health 
information technology over the last several decades. Data gathering, 
physician resistance, and legislation have changed the landscape for 
pharmaceutical companies that promote their drugs to physicians. This 
section provides a history and background of how drug detailing started, 
how physicians responded, and the status of drug detailing today. 
A. The History of Drug Detailing 
The practice of selling prescriber-identifying data in direct-to-
physician marketing has existed for decades. Detailers began gathering 
data from doctors and pharmacists in the 1940s; some successful drug 
reps maintained prescription data sources for years and sometimes even 
decades.40 The federal government did not require prescriptions for drug 
sales until the mid-1950s.41 Before then, the pharmaceutical industry’s 
primary goal was to persuade pharmacies to stock their drugs, as 
opposed to persuading doctors to prescribe them.42 In the 1950s,  
pharmacist Raymond Gosselin formed a company that marketed a 
database that could segment the prescription drug market by region and 
supply information on the performance of specific drugs.43 In 1970, the 
company was sold to IMS Health Inc., a recurring plaintiff in several 
cases dealing with the sale of prescriber-identifying data today.44   
40. Musacchio & Hunkler, supra note 20. 
41. Greene, supra note 5, at 742. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 743. 
44. Id. 
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As database technology has become more sophisticated and  
affordable, HIOs have created systematic, nationwide directories similar 
to the one created by Gosselin. These directories, available for license 
since 1993, depict physicians’ prescribing habits categorized by product 
and volume of prescriptions.45  
In the seminal 1983 New England Journal of Medicine article that 
defined academic detailing, Dr. Jerry Avorn and Stephen Soumerai 
described a randomized, controlled trial of clinical pharmacists visiting 
physicians’ offices to reduce the excessive use of specific drugs.46  
The trial resulted in a 14 percent decrease in prescribing the drugs.47 The 
authors concluded that “academically-based ‘detailing’ may represent a 
useful and cost-effective way to improve the quality of drug-therapy 
decisions and reduce unnecessary expenditures.”48  
B. Physician Resistance to Pharmaceutical Detailing and the  
American Medical Association’s Response 
Within the last decade, physicians have responded to the effects 
commercializing prescriber-identifying data has had on prescribing 
decisions. In 2004, the AMA conducted a physician survey regarding the 
use of prescriber-identifying data by pharmaceutical companies.49 The 
survey showed that the majority of physicians felt that the ability to 
withhold their prescribing data from pharmaceutical sales representatives 
would alleviate their concerns of drug reps intruding upon the doctor-
patient relationship.50 In response to these findings, the AMA created the 
Prescription Data Restriction Program (PDRP). Launched in 2006, the 
PDRP allows physicians to restrict drug reps’ access to prescriber-
identifying data.51  
In practice, the PDRP is simple for physicians to use: they visit a web 
site to opt out of sharing their prescriber-identifying data with  
pharmaceutical representatives.52 Pharmaceutical companies are then 
 
45. Musacchio & Hunkler, supra note 20. 
46. Jerry Avorn & Stephen B. Soumerai, Improving Drug-Therapy Decisions 
Through Educational Outreach: A Randomized Controlled Trial of 
Academically Based “Detailing”, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1457, 1457 (1983); 
see Biography of Dr. Jerry Avorn, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR ACAD. DETAILING, 
http://www.narcad.org/experience/avorn/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2013) 
(explaining that Dr. Avorn invented the concept of academic detailing and 
is recognized as a leading expert on the topic). 
47. Avorn & Soumerai, supra note 46, at 1457. 
48. Id. 
49. AMA Program, supra note 22. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
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required to check the opt-out list a minimum of four times a year and 
have ninety days to comply with any opt-out requests.53 The program also 
ensures that physicians know how to report inappropriate pharmaceutical-
employee behavior, that HIOs help physicians understand how prescribing 
data is used, and that reports are created for physicians from the data to 
enhance their clinical practices.54 
The AMA does not collect, sell, or have access to prescribing data, 
but HIOs do match information from the AMA’s Physician Masterfile to 
prescribing data from other sources, such as pharmacies.55 The Masterfile 
contains all physicians’ current and historical data.56 HIOs create reports 
by combining prescribing and Masterfile data and license these reports 
to pharmaceutical companies.57  
Nevertheless, the PDRP has had little impact on restricting pre-
scriber-identifying data. As of June 2011, only 28,000 of roughly 650,000 
practicing physicians in the country have opted out through the PDRP.58 
The AMA claims that it has distributed information about the PDRP to 
over 500,000 physicians in the last three years.59 Other sources claim, 
however, that only 25 percent of physicians are aware that the PDRP 
even exists.60  
The PDRP helps address many concerns, but it does not protect all 
prescribers and does not restrict all pharmaceutical employees from 
accessing prescribers’ identifying data. Only medical doctors can opt out 
through the PDRP, while other prescribers (for example, osteopathic 
physicians or nurse practitioners) are ineligible to opt out.61 While 
physicians account for the largest portion of prescribers, this gap allows 
drug reps to target other prescribers potentially against their wishes. 
This loophole may create a problem for states where advanced practice 
 
53. See id. 
54. Id. 
55. AMA Physician Masterfile, AMA, http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
ama/pub/about-ama/physician-data-resources/physician-masterfile.page 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
56. Id. 
57. AMA Program, supra note 22. 
58. Physicians Discuss Use of Prescribing Data, AMA, http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/dbl-public/pdrp_two_sides.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 
2013); David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the Protection of 
Patients’ Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 78 (2010).  
59. AMA Program, supra note 22. 
60. Greene, supra note 5, at 746. 
61. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 23 n.17 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011). 
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nurses or other medical professionals have independent authority to 
prescribe medications to patients.62  
Furthermore, the PDRP restricts only drug reps and their direct 
supervisors from accessing prescriber-identifying data.63 Other officials at 
pharmaceutical companies are still allowed access to the information.64 
Other than the pharmaceutical industry’s own code of ethics,65 nothing 
prevents an executive in a pharmaceutical company from “reminding” a 
sales representative about a particular physician’s prescribing history 
regardless of whether the physician has opted out.66 To address this 
issue, the AMA created mechanisms to allow physicians to report 
inappropriate conduct by pharmaceutical representatives or companies.67 
Allowing physicians to monitor pharmaceutical companies acts as safety 
net for when the companies fail to police themselves.68  
Finally, the primary concerns at issue are safety and cost of  
prescription drugs for patients. Should physicians be the only ones making 
the decisions regarding sales reps’ roles in the physician-patient  
relationship? This has led some states to enact legislation banning the use 
of prescriber-identifying information with varying degrees of physician 
privacy options, which will be discussed in further detail in Section III.69 
C. Pharmaceutical Detailing Today 
While establishing the PDRP was a seemingly reasonable  
compromise between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry, some 
claim that the program does not restrict enough, while others argue that 
the program is too limiting. Those claiming that the PDRP is not 
restrictive enough argue that a drug rep’s job is to increase sales—not to 
offer unbiased, evidence-based information to physicians. Hence, allowing 
the pharmaceutical industry to influence the prescribing patterns of 
physicians by offering them potentially biased information runs counter 
 
62. See, e.g., Lauren E. Gattanglia, Supervision and Collaboration 
Requirement: The Vulnerability of Nurse Practitioners and Its Implications 
for Retail Health, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1127, 1137 n.55 (2010) (observing 
that in 2008 about twenty percent of states allowed nurse practitioners 
independent prescriptive authority). 
63. AMA Program, supra note 22. 
64. Steinbrook, supra note 17, at 2745. 
65. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS 
WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 13 (2009). 
66. Allison Torres Burtka, Drug Reps and the Art of Manipulation, 46 TRIAL 
28, 34 (2010).  
67. AMA Program, supra note 22. 
68. Id. 
69. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
318:47-f (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009), invalidated by 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
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to the AMA’s mission of promoting the science of medicine and the 
betterment of public health.70 Conversely, others argue that restricting 
pharmaceutical companies from accessing the data would likely increase 
sales calls, decrease targeted educational information, and decrease drug 
samples for physicians.71 Furthermore, if pharmaceutical manufacturers 
are overly restricted from purchasing prescriber-identifying data, then 
HIOs may no longer have a financial incentive to maintain valuable data 
on physicians’ prescribing habits.72  
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are not the only entities that  
purchase prescriber-identifying data from HIOs. Several other parties 
purchase HIO-collected data for medical research, law enforcement, 
public health studies, drug recalls, studies on drug interactions, and even 
bioterrorism response.73 For example, the FDA, the Center for Disease 
Control, and the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency all use prescriber-
identifying data to monitor use of controlled substances and to identify 
prescribers who need time-sensitive safety information.74 Insurance 
companies and pharmacy benefit managers also use prescriber-identifying 
data to process claims and manage formulary compliance.75 These other 
parties, however, spend far less on this data than the pharmaceutical 
industry.76 If too many physicians opt out through the PDRP or if 
legislation bans the use of prescriber-identifying data, then HIOs may 
stop maintaining their billion-dollar databases or divert those resources 
to areas that do not benefit the healthcare industry.77  
Increased drug costs, patient safety issues, and complaints about the 
PDRP eventually led three states—Maine, Vermont, and New  
Hampshire—to enact legislation banning the use of prescriber-identifying 
data for marketing purposes.78 However, suppressing the free flow of 
information to pharmaceutical companies was not an effective solution to 
these states’ concerns.  
70. See Laurie Barclay, AMA Discloses Masterfile Physician Data to 
Pharmaceutical Companies, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (July 12, 2007), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/559704. 
71. AMA Program, supra note 22. 
72. Steinbrook, supra note 17, at 2747. 
73. Greene, supra note 5, at 747. 
74. Brief of Respondents IMS Health Inc. et al. at 37-38, Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779). 
75. Id. at 2-3. 
76. Steinbrook, supra note 17, at 2747. 
77. Brief for American Business Media et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 11, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 
10-779). 
78. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
318:47-f (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009), invalidated by 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
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II. IMS Health Inc. Litigation in the First Circuit 
Before the Supreme Court of the United States decided Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., several states were concerned with the impact of 
prescriber-identifying data on drug detailing, the patient-physician 
relationship, and higher drug costs borne by patients. These concerns led 
New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont to enact statutes banning the use 
of prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes.79 This section 
provides a synopsis of the legal battles that Maine and New Hampshire 
faced in district court and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
after enacting these statutes. 
A. Some Clarification on Parties to the IMS Health Inc. Cases 
Confusion exists over exactly who the parties are to these lawsuits. 
The defendant in each case is the attorney general of the state  
implementing its prescription confidentiality law.80 The plaintiffs are not 
only pharmaceutical companies but also several organizations variously 
identified as “data miners,” “health information publishers,” and 
“prescription drug information intermediaries.” Judge John Woodcock, 
writing the majority opinion in IMS Health Inc. v. Rowe for the United 
States District Court for the District of Maine, explained the reasoning 
behind the many names assigned to the plaintiffs in these cases:  
The Plaintiffs refer to themselves as “health information pub-
lishers,” a name that evokes an image consistent with their 
First Amendment argument; the Attorney General refers to 
them as “data miners,” a term that evokes an image consistent 
with his regulatory contentions. The Court appreciates the 
cleverness and power of characterization, but avoids value-
laden terms . . . . [T]o describe the Plaintiffs, the Court uses 
the term the law uses, ‘prescription drug information interme-
diary.’81 
These “value-laden terms” mislead readers because all the above-listed 
names refer to a single type of organization—firms that analyze  
prescriber-identifying data to create reports on prescriber behavior. 
Judge Woodcock referred to them as “prescription drug information 
intermediaries” because that is the legal term used in Maine.82 This  
79. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 318:47-f (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2009), 
invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
80.  IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d and 
vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); IMS 
Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Me. 2007), rev’d by IMS 
Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010). 
81. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 158 n.3. 
82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-1-I (2008). 
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Article refers to this group of plaintiffs as health information organiza-
tions.  
B. New Hampshire’s Prescription Confidentiality Law 
In 2006, New Hampshire enacted its prescription confidentiality law to 
contain prescription drug costs and protect both prescriber and patient 
privacy.83 The law banned the sale, license, transfer, or use of prescriber-
identifying data for any commercial purpose, although it recognized 
several enumerated exceptions like pharmacy reimbursement, medical 
research, and insurance functions.84 Several HIOs, including IMS Health 
Inc., filed suit against New Hampshire’s Attorney General, challenging the 
constitutionality of the law under the First Amendment.85 The threshold 
question was whether the law regulated speech or conduct, with conduct 
being entitled to substantially less First Amendment protection.86 The 
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire found that 
the statute restricted speech because, although it did not hinder  
transmission of prescription records directly, the statute prevented 
pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifiable data both to 
identify a specific audience for their marketing efforts and to refine their 
marketing messages.87 
After finding that the statute regulated speech instead of conduct, 
the court determined that the speech in question was “commercial 
speech” and applied the US Supreme Court’s test from Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.88 
Under Central Hudson, so long as the speech is a non-misleading, lawful 
activity, government regulation is constitutionally permissible only if the 
statute (1) serves a substantial governmental interest, (2) directly 
advances that interest, and (3) restricts speech only as necessary to 
further that interest.89 The district court found that New Hampshire’s 
interests in containing health care costs and protecting physician 
confidentiality were insufficient to justify restriction under Central 
Hudson.90 First, New Hampshire failed to provide enough evidence to 
 
83. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318 (2006). 
84. Id. at § 318:47-f. 
85. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d and 
vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
86. Id. at 174. 
87. Id. at 183. 
88. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
89. Id. 
90. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 183 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d 
and vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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prove it had a substantial interest in protecting prescriber privacy.91 
Second, although the court agreed that reducing health care costs was a 
substantial state interest, the statute did not directly advance that 
interest, as there were several ways in which the state could address the 
law’s underlying concerns without restricting protected speech.92 The 
court also found that the statute was overly restrictive because many 
other regulatory options—such as gift bans, continuing medical 
 education, and Medicaid revisions—existed to restrict detailing without 
restricting speech.93 The court rendered New Hampshire’s prescription 
confidentiality law unconstitutional and issued an injunction preventing 
the law’s enforcement.94 New Hampshire’s Attorney General appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
C. Maine’s Prescription Confidentiality Law 
Following in the footsteps of New Hampshire, Maine enacted its pre-
scription confidentiality law the next year.95 Like New Hampshire, Maine 
passed its statute to contain prescription drug costs and protect pre-
scriber and patient privacy.96 However, Maine also added “improv[ing] 
public health” to its list of policy concerns.97  
Unlike New Hampshire, Maine allows the use of prescriber-identifying 
data in detailing drugs to physicians unless a physician affirmatively opts 
out of sharing her data.98 Thus, Maine’s law is narrower than New 
Hampshire’s by banning the sale, license, transfer, exchange for value, or 
marketing use of prescriber-identifying data of only those physicians who 
petition the state for confidentiality protection.99  
Several HIOs, including IMS Health Inc., filed suit against Maine’s 
Attorney General, claiming that Maine’s prescription privacy law was 
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.100 With guidance from the New Hampshire 
district court’s decision earlier that year, the District Court for the 
 
91. Id. at 179. 
92. Id. at 182-83. 
93. Id. at 182. 
94. Id. at 183. 
95. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008). 
96. Id. 
97. § 1711-E-1-B. 
98. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f (2006) (allowing physician to 
“opt in” to the prescription confidentiality program), with ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008) (allowing physicians to “opt out” of the 
prescription confidentiality program). 
99. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E-2-A (2008). 
100. IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153, 153 (D. Me. 2007), rev’d 
by IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F. 3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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District of Maine concluded that the state’s prescription confidentiality 
law restricted commercial speech and was subject to intermediate 
scrutiny under Central Hudson.101 Maine tried to distinguish its law from 
New Hampshire’s by arguing that it restricted less speech due to the 
opt-out provision,102 but the court ultimately held Maine’s statute 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.103  
The district court prohibited enforcement of the law but lifted the 
injunction as to certain non-enforcement provisions, such as allowing 
prescribers to register with the state’s opt-out program to gather data 
until the appellate process finalized the court’s decision.104 The plaintiffs 
appealed to the First Circuit. 
D. The First Circuit’s Decision in the IMS Health Cases 
In two different decisions, IMS Health v. Ayotte in 2008 and IMS 
Health v. Mills in 2010, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
both Maine’s and New Hampshire’s prescription confidentiality laws did 
not violate the First Amendment.105 In reversing the lower courts’ 
decisions, the First Circuit found that both statutes regulated conduct 
rather than speech.106 The court characterized prescriber-identifying 
information as a “commodity” with no greater right to protection under 
the First Amendment than “beef jerky.”107 Regulation of conduct under 
the First Amendment requires only that the law be rationally related to 
a legitimate government purpose.108 In both cases, the First Circuit held 
that the statute satisfied this low burden.109 
The First Circuit reasoned that even if the statutes regulated speech, 
as opposed to mere conduct, they both still withstood intermediate 
scrutiny.110 Applying the factors from Central Hudson, the First Circuit 
held that the statute directly advanced at least one substantial  
government interest and that there were no other less-restrictive means of 
accomplishing those interests.111   
101. Id. at 169. 
102. Id. at 168-69. 
103. Id. at 183. 
104. Id. 
105. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); IMS Health Inc. v. 
Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated by 
IMS Health Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011). 
106. Mills, 616 F.3d at 19. 
107. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 53. 
108. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). 
109. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47; Mills, 616 F.3d at 13. 
110. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47; Mills, 616 F.3d at 13. 
111. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47; Mills, 616 F.3d at 19. 
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The only distinguishing factor the First Circuit found between the 
Maine and New Hampshire laws concerned physician privacy options. 
While Maine allowed physicians to opt out of sharing their prescriber-
identifying information, New Hampshire imposed a total ban on the data 
with some enumerated exceptions.112 The court found that Maine’s law 
differed from New Hampshire’s “only in ways that weaken[ed] the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges,”113 and the distinction did not 
change the First Circuit’s holding.114 
After the First Circuit’s decisions, it appeared as if states were finally 
able to the efforts of pharmaceutical detailers. However, the holding of one 
appellate court was far from the final say in the matter. As discussed 
below, the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court were not as lenient in 
their interpretation of a similar prescription confidentiality law in  
Vermont. 
III. Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law  
and the Supreme Court’s Decision in  
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 
With favorable decisions from the First Circuit, Vermont was likely 
confident in successfully enacting its own prescription confidentiality 
law. However, unlike those in Maine and New Hampshire, Vermont’s law 
reached Supreme Court. This section analyzes the decisions of the 
United States District Court for the District of Vermont, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc. 
A. How Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law Differs from 
Maine and New Hampshire’s Laws 
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law, also known as Act 80, 
had several components aimed at hindering pharmaceutical detailing. 
The law’s most controversial provision was Section 4631(d): 
A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic  
transmission intermediary, a pharmacy, or other similar entity 
shall not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records con-
 
112. Mills, 616 F.3d at 19. 
113. See id. (noting that “[u]nlike New Hampshire’s law, the Maine law only 
prohibits plaintiffs from licensing, using, selling, transferring or exchanging 
data identifying prescribers licensed in Maine who have opted-in for 
confidentiality protection;” and “[u]nlike New Hampshire’s legislature, the 
Maine legislature included specific findings that limiting detailers’ use of 
Maine prescribers’ identifying data would reduce health care costs, ensure 
Maine prescribers’ decisions were based on unbiased medical and scientific 
evidence, and protect Maine prescribers from unwanted detailing visits.”). 
114. Id. 
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taining prescriber-identifiable information, nor permit the use of 
regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information for 
marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber 
consents . . . . Pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical 
marketers shall not use prescriber-identifiable information for 
marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber 
consents . . . .115 
Section 4631(d) comprises three prohibitions: (1) pharmacies, health 
insurers, and similar entities may not sell prescriber-identifying  
information; (2) those entities may not use prescriber-identifying  
information for marketing; and (3) pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
pharmaceutical marketers may not use prescriber-identifying information 
for marketing purposes.116 The prohibitions do not apply, however, if an 
individual prescriber “opts in” to sharing his information with HIOs and 
pharmaceutical representatives.117  
The prescriber’s privacy options in Vermont fall somewhere between 
Maine’s opt-out provision and New Hampshire’s blanket ban.118 While a 
seemingly important issue, physician privacy options have proven to be 
of little importance in court decisions. The lower courts extensively 
discussed the differences in how each of these privacy options burdened 
speech, but the issue never changed their decisions.  
Each state’s prescription confidentiality law also asserted different 
state interests. Maine and New Hampshire listed patient privacy as a state 
interest but Vermont did not. The only court to reach the patient-privacy 
issue was the District Court of Maine, which found that the interest did 
not survive intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson.119 Courts likely 
do not find that patient privacy is an issue in prescription confidentiality 
laws because healthcare providers must de-identify patients’ medical 
records (i.e., they must remove personal information like names, addresses, 
and social security numbers) pursuant to HIPAA.120 Many privacy 
advocates argue that although the prescriptions have been de-identified, 
 
115. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
116. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660 (2011). 
117. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
118. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (allowing physicians to opt in to 
sharing prescriber information), and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318:47-f 
(2006) (placing a ban on prescriber information with several listed 
exceptions), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1711-E (allowing 
physicians to opt out of sharing prescriber information). 
119. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011). 
120. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), 164.514(a)-(b) (2011).  
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they can be re-identified using outside sources of data.121 For example, in 
2006, America Online accidentally released users’ search query  
information, which others were able to combine with publicly available 
data to identify people’s medical conditions.122 However, while providing 
prescriber-identifying data to pharmaceutical companies runs the risk of  
re-identification, state and federal medical privacy laws already address 
this issue.123 
B. Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law in the Lower Courts 
In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed its prescription confidentiali-
ty law banning the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that 
reveal the prescribing practices of individual physicians.124 Violators 
faced a $10,000 penalty for each infraction, ensuring that pharmaceutical 
companies would not treat the statute as merely “the cost of doing 
business.”125 In 2009, Vermont HIOs, including IMS Health Inc., and 
several pharmaceutical manufacturing associations, filed suit to challenge 
the constitutionality of the law.126  
Following a bench trial, the District Court for the District of  
Vermont denied the plaintiffs’ motions for declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief.127 The court found that Vermont’s statute regulated 
speech and was thus subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central 
Hudson.128 Additionally, the court found that Vermont’s cost-
containment and public health interests were substantial, but not its 
interest in prescriber privacy.129 The court further found that the statute 
directly advanced both of those interests and that no less-restrictive 
means were available to further them.130 The plaintiffs appealed to the 
 
121. Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. as Amici 
Curiae supporting Petitioners at 24, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653 (2011) (No. 10-779).  
122. Carol Eisenberg, Drugmakers Mine Data for Trial Patients, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/drugmakers-mine-data-for-trial-patients-11032011.html. 
123. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2011); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.514(a)-(b) 
(2011) (explaining the rules pertaining to de-identification of protected 
health information). 
124. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2010), invalidated by Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
125. Id. 
126. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2661 (2011). 
127. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 464 (D. Vt. 2009). 
128. Id. at 449. 
129. Id. at 449-50. 
130. Id. at 454-55. 
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the district 
court’s decision and remanded the case.131  
The Second Circuit found that Section 4631(d) of Vermont’s pre-
scription confidentiality law qualified as a restriction on commercial 
speech and was subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central  
Hudson.132 The court first found Vermont’s physician privacy interest 
too speculative to qualify as a substantial state interest.133 The court 
then found that, while Vermont’s interests in public health and reducing 
health care costs were substantial, the statute did not advance those 
interests in a direct and material way.134 Finally, the court found that 
the law was not narrowly tailored to serve Vermont’s cost-containment 
and public health interests.135 Vermont’s Attorney General appealed to 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Recognizing the split between 
the First and Second Circuits, the Court granted certiorari on January 
7, 2011.136 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s 
decision in a 6-3 decision that ruled Vermont’s law unconstitutional as a 
violation of the First Amendment right to free speech.137 The majority, 
led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that Vermont’s law imposed a 
specific, content- and speaker-based burden on protected expression, 
thereby warranting “heightened” judicial scrutiny to determine whether 
the statute violated First Amendment free-speech protections.138 The 
Court further held that Vermont’s asserted interests in physician 
confidentiality, protecting physicians from bothersome pharmaceutical 
sales representatives, and protecting the doctor-patient relationship did 
not justify restricting protected free speech.139 Finally, the Court held 
that the statute did not permissibly advance Vermont’s policy goals of 
lowering medical costs and promoting public health.140 
 
131. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 282 (2d Cir. 2010). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 276. 
134. Id. at 279. 
135. Id. at 282. 
136. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 630 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 
S. Ct. 857 (Jan. 7, 2011) (No. 10-779). 
137. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011). 
138. Id. at 2667. 
139. Id. at 2669-70. 
140. Id. at 2670. 
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D. “Heightened” Judicial Scrutiny and the First Amendment 
The threshold issue in Sorrell was which level of scrutiny applied to 
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law. While Vermont argued that 
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate under Central Hudson, the 
plaintiffs argued not only that Vermont’s law failed under Central 
Hudson, but also that the Court should apply a different test affording 
commercial speech greater First Amendment protection.141  
Ultimately, the Court applied what it termed “heightened scrutiny” 
after determining that Vermont’s law unconstitutionally placed content- 
and speaker-based restrictions on free speech.142 The strictness of 
“heightened scrutiny” is unclear, but based on the structure of the 
majority’s analysis, dissenting Justice Breyer characterized it as “an 
unforgiving brand of intermediate scrutiny.”143 Vermont argued that 
heightened scrutiny was unwarranted because the law was attempting to 
regulate only commercial activity.144 The Court agreed that the First 
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or 
conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.145 The Court noted, 
however, that Vermont’s statute allowed prescription information to be 
studied and used by all but pharmaceutical companies, thereby imposing 
content- and speaker-based restrictions on speech.146  
Obviating the need to decide which level of scrutiny applied to  
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law, the Court held that the 
statute failed under either heightened or intermediate scrutiny.147 The 
dissent, led by Justice Breyer, argued that Central Hudson should have 
applied and that Vermont’s law was a reasonable effort to regulate 
commercial activity that imposed no significant burden on free speech.148 
Breyer opined that the majority was returning to a time in which the 
Court stepped into the shoes of state legislators.149  
E. Protecting Physician Privacy under Heightened Scrutiny 
While the Court noted that Vermont’s physicians had an interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of their prescription decisions,150 it found 
 
141. See id. at 2667-68.  
142. Id. at 2664.  
143. Id. at 2679. 
144. Id. at 2664. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 2667. 
147. See id. at 2668. 
148. Id. at 2673. 
149. Id. at 2679. 
150. Id. at 2668. 
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that Vermont’s law was not drawn to serve that interest because 
pharmacies could share prescriber-identifying data “with anyone for any 
reason” except marketing.151 Vermont argued that the statute’s opt-in 
provision allows the statute to withstand scrutiny. The Court, however, 
found that this created only a “contrived choice” under which Vermont 
offered doctors two options: (1) allow everyone to use their prescribing 
data, or (2) forbid the use of their prescribing data by those Vermont 
did not support without an option to curtail use by Vermont’s favored 
speakers.152 The Court hinted that a broader choice of options in 
restricting the use of the data might help—but would “not necessarily 
save”—the statute from failing under the First Amendment.153  
The Court never reached the argument of whether the statute  
directly advanced Vermont’s interest in physician privacy.154 Rather, the 
Court ended its inquiry immediately, finding that the statute did not 
advance Vermont’s interest in physician privacy at all because the 
statute granted such extensive use of prescriber-identifying information 
to other parties, such as medical researchers and government entities.155 
The Court ended Vermont’s physician-privacy argument by finding 
not only that the statute did not advance the state’s interest in physician 
privacy, but that the interest could be achieved by “remedies other than 
content-based rules.”156 The Court noted that “physicians can, and often 
do, simply decline to meet with detailers, including detailers who use 
prescriber-identifying information.”157 Interestingly, the Court failed to 
mention the PDRP, a private-sector solution not subject to the First 
Amendment.  
F. Containing Prescription Drug Costs under Heightened Scrutiny 
The majority acknowledged that Vermont’s second policy concern, 
containing prescription drug costs, was a proper government interest.158 
But the Court found yet again that Vermont’s statute did not advance 
that interest in a constitutionally permissible way.159 The Court found 
that the statute did not directly regulate the price of prescription drugs, 
but only sought to lower drug costs by indirectly curbing detailers’ ability 
 
151. Id. 
152. Mello & Messing, supra note 19, at 1250. 
153. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669. 
154. See id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 2670. 
159. Id. 
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to influence prescribing decisions.160 The Court noted that “the ‘fear that 
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot 
justify content-based burdens on speech.”161 Sufficiently convinced that 
Vermont’s interest in cost containment of prescription drugs failed under 
the First Amendment, the Court did not offer any examples of less 
restrictive means for achieving that interest. In short, the Court suggested 
that drug reps are simply too good at their jobs and that Vermont could 
not restrict speech merely because physicians are persuaded by detailers’ 
messages. 
G. Promoting Public Health under Heightened Scrutiny 
The Court paid little attention to Vermont’s final asserted interest 
of promoting public health, noting that “[e]ven the United States, which 
appeared here in support of Vermont, took care to dispute the State’s 
unwarranted view that the dangers of new drugs outweigh their benefits 
to patients.”162 Lumping this policy interest with containing drug costs, 
the Court noted that promoting public health was a proper government 
interest. Yet again, the Court found that the statute did not advance 
that interest in a constitutionally permissible way by indirectly curbing 
drug reps’ ability to influence prescription decisions.163  
The Court failed to mention Vermont’s evidence showing that  
pharmaceutical drug detailing boosted the prescribing of newly approved, 
brand-name drugs, including Vioxx and Baycol.164 This may be because 
Vermont and other states argued that generic alternatives were safer, not 
that certain brand-name drugs may be dangerous. Even though the 
Supreme Court did not address this issue in its opinion, Ayotte pointed 
out that no evidence was offered to prove that generic alternatives are 
safer than even the most dangerous brand-name drugs.165  
H. The Majority Provides Some Guidance 
Sorrell struck a major blow to the movement against the use of  
prescriber-identifying data in pharmaceutical detailing. However, the 
Court did provide some guidance for lawmakers to craft statutes that 
may survive the heightened scrutiny applied by the Court in Sorrell.  
 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 2670-71 (quoting Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 
357, 374 (2002)). 
162. Id. at 2671 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 24 n.4, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653 (2011) (No. 10-779)). 
163. Id. at 2670. 
164. Mello & Messing, supra note 19, at 1251. 
165. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 163, 180 (D.N.H. 2007), rev’d 
and vacated by IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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First, the majority suggested that Vermont could have constructed 
“a more coherent policy,” similar to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.166 The 
Court was likely implying that more than one party (detailers) should be 
excluded from using prescriber-identifying information. Second, the 
Court suggested that if Vermont changed its prescription confidentiality 
law from an opt-in to an opt-out structure like Maine’s law, then the 
proposed law “might burden less speech” but “would not necessarily 
save” the statute.167 Third, the Court advised that physicians should 
simply close their doors to drug reps—a private-sector solution to the 
problem not subject to the First Amendment.168  
The Court never stated that following the first two suggestions 
would automatically harmonize a statute with the First Amendment. 
Any state that implements a prescription confidentiality law based on 
those suggestions would still be taking a risk when other, less-
objectionable approaches might be equally effective. While not involving 
any government action, the third above-listed suggestion is equally 
ineffective. The next section will explain why these suggestions will not 
work.  
IV. Government Responses to Pharmaceutical  
Detailing 
Critics of increased oversight view the government’s actions as pater-
nalistic and argued that physicians should be responsible enough to close 
their doors to drug reps and find time to seek out additional information 
on prescription drugs.169 On the other hand, proponents of increasing 
regulation believe that the government should more actively oversee the 
health of its citizens and assist busy physicians who receive potentially 
biased information from drug reps.170 However, no perfect solution exists. 
This section explores possible solutions to the problems raised by detailing 
and how they would likely fail in light of Sorrell. 
A. Enacting Legislation Banning the Use of Prescriber-Identifying 
Data Will Likely Fail Under the First Amendment 
Although Maine’s prescription confidentiality law may still be  
constitutional, it needs to be reconsidered in light of Sorrell. Because of 
the Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the First Amendment in 
regards to these statutes, states should refrain from enacting prescription 
 
166. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, 
Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195 (1999)).  
167. Id. at 2669. 
168. Id. at 2669-70. 
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confidentiality laws of their own even if they learn from other states’ 
mistakes or take the Supreme Court’s advice.  
While the Supreme Court did leave state legislators some leeway to 
create statutes banning the use of prescriber-identifying data for  
marketing purposes, it left them that room at the bottom of the steep 
hill called “heighted judicial scrutiny.” Not only did the Supreme Court 
find that heightened judicial scrutiny applies to prescription confidential-
ity laws, it noted that Vermont’s statute would still fail under 
intermediate scrutiny.171 Thus, state legislators may find crafting a 
similar prescription confidentiality law that would pass constitutional 
muster very difficult.  
The majority in Sorrell suggested that other states might be more 
successful than Vermont by permitting the sale or disclosure of  
prescriber-identifying data in only a few narrow and well-justified  
circumstances, similar to the Privacy Rule set out in HIPAA.172 The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule provides federal regulations for protecting certain 
health information held by healthcare providers, health plans, and 
healthcare clearinghouses, while giving patients rights with respect to that 
information.173 The Privacy Rule also permits the disclosure of protected 
health information needed for patient care and in narrow instances 
important to public health.174 The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not focus on 
any single group when restricting access to protected health information.  
The Sorrell Court found that, unlike the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law made prescriber-identifying 
information available to “an almost limitless audience” while barring 
only pharmaceutical manufacturers and HIOs from accessing that 
information.175 The majority explained that the structure of the statute 
allowed the information to be studied and used by all but a narrow class 
of disfavored speakers—the pharmaceutical industry—and did not justify 
the burden the statute places on protected free speech.176  
The dissent observed that the majority’s proposed solution of 
likening Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law to HIPAA would 
ironically deny access to prescriber-identifying data to more people, thus 
imposing a greater burden upon the dissemination of information.177 As 
noted above, a number of parties have access to prescriber-identifying 
information: pharmaceutical companies; medical researchers; and 
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government programs monitoring bioterrorism threats, drug recalls, and 
public health.178 Some parties use prescriber-identifying information to 
help reduce prescription drug costs. For example, government healthcare 
programs, such as Medicare, use prescriber-identifying information to 
convince physicians to prescribe generic drugs.179 Similarly, insurance 
companies contact physicians with high rates of prescribing brand-name 
drugs to persuade them to prescribe drugs that cost the insurance 
company less money.180 A statute that excludes any of these additional 
parties from accessing this data risks countering essential state interests 
such as promoting public health or reducing prescription drug costs. 
Therefore, although the Court seemingly afforded other states an 
opportunity to pass similar legislation, following the majority’s advice 
may prove counterintuitive.  
Finally, statutes banning the use of prescriber-identifying data may 
slow but will not stop pharmaceutical companies from detailing brand-
name drugs to physicians.181 No provisions in Maine, New Hampshire, or 
Vermont’s statutes expressly prohibited detailers from communicating 
truthful information to physicians; detailers must simply convey it 
without the aid of prescriber-identifying information. Drug sales are far 
too lucrative for pharmaceutical companies to stop promoting their 
products to physicians. Even if prescription confidentiality laws were to 
stop drug reps from detailing brand-name drugs to physicians, pharma-
ceutical companies would likely divert more money to direct-to-consumer 
drug advertising, resulting in patients themselves becoming the new drug 
reps.182   
B. Giving Physicians More Privacy Options Is Irrelevant to the Courts 
The distinguishing provision between Vermont’s and Maine’s  
prescription confidentiality laws was the prescribers’ ability to opt in or 
opt out of sharing prescriber-identifying information with drug reps. 
Opting in generally prohibits the sale, license, or transfer of the prescriber-
identifying data for marketing purposes unless an individual physician 
chooses to make the data available.183 Opting out, on the other hand, 
prohibits the sale, license, or transfer of the data for marketing purposes 
only if an individual physician chooses to restrict third parties from 
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accessing the data, similar to the AMA’s PDRP.184 An unconditional ban 
prohibits the sale, license, or transfer of this data, leaving prescribers no 
choice in the matter.185 
As noted in the previous section, Vermont allowed physicians to opt 
in to sharing their prescriber-identifying information, and the Supreme 
Court found the statute unconstitutional.186 Maine’s law, on the other 
hand, allowed physicians to opt out of sharing their prescriber-identifying 
information, and its statute’s constitutionality is still undecided. New 
Hampshire’s law, which placed an unconditional ban on the release of 
prescriber-identifying information, is also unconstitutional, as it is even 
more restrictive than Vermont’s law.  
Most states will likely refrain from enacting prescription-
confidentiality laws similar to those in Vermont or New Hampshire. 
However, states that wish to enact statutes similar to Maine’s prescription 
confidentiality law should also refrain from doing so because it could still 
be invalidated. The majority in Sorrell noted that Vermont might have 
restricted less speech by switching to Maine’s opt-out format, though that 
“would not necessarily save” Vermont’s statute from failing under the 
First Amendment.187  
C. Telling Physicians to Close Their Doors Will Not Solve Anything 
The majority in Sorrell suggested that physicians could simply close 
their doors to detailers.188 According to the Court, “[d]octors who wish to 
forgo detailing altogether are free to give ‘No Solicitation’ or ‘No 
Detailing’ instructions to their office managers or to receptionists at 
their places of work.”189 In fact, several hospitals and physician offices 
already deny drug reps entry.190 So why should it matter if drug reps 
access physicians’ prescribing information? 
While closing the door to drug reps may protect physicians’ privacy, 
it will do nothing to lower drug costs for patients and leaves physicians 
with less information on brand-name prescription drugs.191 Furthermore, 
closing the door to drug reps would heavily reduce physicians’ access to 
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free drug samples that physicians provide to patients at no cost.192 As 
noted above, physicians have limited time to research new prescription 
drugs without sacrificing time with patients. If physicians choose to 
simply turn a deaf ear, then where will they find time to research 
information on the drugs they are prescribing to patients?  
V. Academic Detailing Is the Best Response  
to Sorrell 
According to the Supreme Court, providing physicians with more—
not less—information is the answer to states’ issues with the use of 
prescriber-identifying data in drug detailing.193 As one Vermont physician 
stated: “We have a saying in medicine, information is power. And the 
more you know, or anyone knows, the better decisions can be made.”194 
The Supreme Court agreed, announcing that “information is not in itself 
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are 
well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them.”195 To avoid the 
legal pitfalls faced by Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, states should 
take the Supreme Court’s advice by supporting academic-detailing 
programs. This section explains how academic detailing can successfully 
protect physician privacy, contain prescription drug costs, and promote 
public health without legal interference. 
A. What Is Academic Detailing? 
Academic detailing, otherwise known as “educational outreach,” is a 
form of continuing medical education in which trained health professionals 
such as physicians, registered nurses, advanced practice nurses, and 
pharmacists visit prescribers to provide evidence-based information on 
prescription drugs.196 Academic detailing combines the direct-to-physician 
marketing approach of the pharmaceutical industry with academic, 
evidence-based, noncommercial information.197 As an initial matter, it is 
important to distinguish academic detailing from “counter detailing.”  
Critics contend that academic and counter detailing are no different 
because they both attempt to limit access to newer, breakthrough drugs 
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in the interest of saving money.198 The goals of each program, however, 
differ greatly. Counter detailing involves dissuading physicians from 
prescribing a particular drug and perhaps prescribing a different drug in 
its place.199 Pharmaceutical companies often engage in counter detailing 
against each other.200 Some states, such as Vermont, have been accused 
of engaging in counter detailing merely to persuade physicians to 
prescribe generics over brand-name drugs solely in the name of cost 
savings.201  
On the other hand, academic detailing, as described by its inventor 
Jerry Avorn, “is not about promoting the cheapest drugs or generic 
drugs per se; it is about prescribing the most appropriate drugs based on 
safety and efficacy data, and when all else is equal, prescribing cost-
effective therapeutic options. The primary focus is on the evidence.”202 
Presenting evidence-based information improves patient health outcomes 
and lowers prescription drug costs, thus aligning the interests of  
patients, physicians, and payers.203  
Pharmaceutical companies argue that academic detailers hold an  
unfair competitive advantage in communicating with prescribers because 
academic detailers do not hold themselves to the same ethical standards as 
pharmaceutical detailers, who voluntarily refrain from providing gifts and 
meals to physicians.204 While the government does not regulate academic 
detailers in the same way as pharmaceutical detailers, comparing the two 
is inapposite. Academic detailers have some form of higher education with 
a clinical background, whereas many pharmaceutical detailers have no 
clinical background beyond a few weeks of on-the-job training.205  
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Academic detailers are more analogous to “medical science liaisons” 
(MSLs), therapeutic specialists within pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and 
medical device companies who have advanced scientific training and 
pharmaceutical degrees in the life sciences.206  
The exact number of states utilizing academic detailing programs is 
difficult to ascertain because states choose many different levels of 
implementation, ranging from fully-funded government programs to 
smaller, private programs with little to no government involvement.207 
Thus far, eighteen states and Washington, D.C. have academic detailing 
programs in some form.208  
While the United States began implementing academic detailing just 
recently, several other countries have utilized it successfully for years.209 
Five Canadian provinces currently have academic detailing programs 
employing a total of thirty detailers.210 The programs collaborate 
through an umbrella program known as the Canadian Academic  
Detailing Collaboration that is facilitated by monthly conference calls.211 
Many other countries, including the United Kingdom, France, and the 
Netherlands, also have academic detailing programs currently in place.212 
Since 1991, Australia has utilized academic detailing through the Drug 
and Therapeutics Information Service and the National Prescribing 
Service, which conduct more than 9,000 academic detailing visits 
annually, demonstrating academic detailing’s ability to operate in large 
countries.213 
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B. Federal Initiatives for Academic Detailing Programs 
Although academic detailing has been around since 1983,214 the  
federal government took an interest in the idea only recently. In 2009, 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) allocated $1.1 
billion to the Department of Health and Human Services to conduct 
comparative effectiveness research analyzing different 
healthcare interventions.215 Of these funds, $300 million was directed to 
lay the groundwork for a broader federal academic detailing program.216 
One year later, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act further 
solidified government-funded comparative effectiveness research by 
creating the Patient Centered Outcomes and Research  
Institute (PCORI), an independent program intended to provide 
patients with a better understanding of the best prevention, treatment, 
and care options available as well as the scientific information support-
ing those options.217  
In April 2010, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ), a government-run program under the Department of Health 
and Human Services, solicited contractors to support an academic-
detailing initiative to integrate the agency’s comparative-effectiveness 
tools through on-site visits with clinicians, nurses, health plan  
formularies, and professionals.218 AHRQ awarded a contract to create a 
publicity center and regional dissemination centers and to evaluate the 
impact of the other contracts.”219  
C. Legal Advantages of Academic Detailing 
As shown in Sorrell, Vermont’s attempt to suppress the free flow of 
prescriber-identifying data to pharmaceutical detailers was impermissible 
under the First Amendment.220 Academic detailing, on the other hand, 
can sufficiently achieve many of the same policy goals, such as contain-
ing prescription drug costs and promoting public health, with no legal 
interference. Academic detailing does not stifle or necessarily even 
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contradict the speech of pharmaceutical detailers; it simply provides 
physicians with more information on prescription drugs.221 It offers 
physicians greater prescribing autonomy by supplying scientific  
information.222 As the Court noted in Sorrell, “private decision-making 
can avoid governmental partiality and thus insulate privacy measures 
from First Amendment challenge.”223 Because courts will not monitor an 
academic detailing program under the high-power judicial microscope of 
“heightened scrutiny,” any legal action brought against a program will 
likely not face such judicial challenges.  
D. Protecting Physician Privacy with Academic Detailing and the 
PDRP 
Protecting physician privacy was the only policy goal that the pre-
scription confidentiality laws in Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire all 
had in common.224 The Court did not recognize physician privacy as a 
substantial government interest and further noted that banning the use 
of prescriber-identifying data would not solve the issue.225 Outside of 
banning drug reps from physicians’ offices altogether, nothing will stop 
drug reps from promoting their products to physicians. There is simply 
too much money at stake. 
The larger concern of courts, legislatures, and society is not to pro-
tect physicians; rather, it is to protect patients, whether that involves 
their personal health information, health outcomes, or money spent on 
health care.226 HIPAA and other state medical privacy laws already 
protect patients’ privacy by restricting disclosure of patients’ protected 
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health information.227 There are very few, if any, existing laws addressing 
the privacy rights of physicians. 
However, if physicians are concerned about protecting the privacy of 
their prescribing habits, there is an existing solution that academic 
detailers can remind physicians of during office visits—the AMA’s 
Physician Data Restriction Program.228 Through the PDRP, physicians 
may restrict pharmaceutical detailers from accessing the AMA’s  
Masterfile to obtain their contact information, which prevents them from 
assembling prescriber-identifying data reports.229 As discussed above, this 
is a private-sector solution to a problem that Vermont, New Hampshire, 
and Maine unsuccessfully tried to solve through government regula-
tion.230 While academic detailing itself may not protect physicians’ 
privacy rights, academic detailers can at least provide physicians with 
the right information to do so.  
E. Reducing Prescription Drug Costs with Academic Detailing 
As shown in Sorrell, laws banning the use of prescriber-identifying 
information do not directly advance the goal of containing prescription-
drug costs.231 Academic detailing, however, has already proven to 
contain prescription drug costs in several ways.232 Studies on the cost of 
academic detailing indicate that potential savings exist through utilizing 
cheaper or fewer high-cost prescription drugs.233 According to a Harvard 
Medical School study, for every dollar spent on an academic detailing 
program, a state saves at least two dollars in reduced drug costs.234 This 
study directly compared physicians who were receptive to academic 
detailer visits with those who were not in Medicaid programs in  
Arkansas, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington, D.C.235 The 
study found that academic detailing significantly reduced prescriptions 
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for three often overused drugs: Cephalexin, Propoxyphene, and Papaver-
ine.236  
In addition to decreasing utilization of over-prescribed drugs,  
academic detailing can save states money by persuading physicians to 
switch from prescribing expensive, brand-name drugs to generics when 
equally effective and medically appropriate.237 According to one study, 
increased use of generic drugs would result in a cost savings of $8.8 
billion dollars per year nationwide.238 For example, evidence shows that 
the first choice for treating patients with high blood pressure should be 
an inexpensive thiazide diuretic rather than any one of several new, 
more expensive, brand-name drugs that pharmaceutical detailers 
promote to physicians.239 
Academic detailing can also reduce costs outside of prescription 
drugs by preventing disease. While the IMS Health litigation generally 
focused on cost savings associated with prescription drugs, states can 
also utilize academic detailing to expand cost savings into other medical 
arenas, such as techniques and tools that address office-based barriers to 
cancer screening.240 In one study assessing the effects of academic 
detailing on increasing breast cancer screening in two medically-
underserved communities, researchers found a statistically-significant 
intervention effect on mammography and clinical breast examination by 
female patients age forty and over.241 Physicians choosing to receive 
educational information from academic detailers on breast cancer 
screenings correctly identified significantly more risk factors for breast 
cancer than physicians not participating in the study.242  
Academic detailing can save states money in several ways that  
prescription confidentiality laws cannot: by curbing overprescribing of 
expensive drugs, increasing prescribing of generic drugs when medically 
appropriate, and potentially reducing future medical expenses by 
preventing disease.  
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F. Academic Detailing Programs’ Costs Weighed against Profits 
The high cost of starting effective academic detailing programs raises 
doubts about their cost-effectiveness. Annual funding for large academic 
detailing programs can range from $1-2 million.243 A portion of this 
budget derives from annual salaries paid to medical professionals. In 
2008, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the average annual 
wage for academic detailers ranged from $74,370 to $137,290.244  
A 2001 article in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
recommends that state policymakers use a formula to decide whether 
implementing an academic detailing program is cost-effective.245 The 
article explores the cost-effectiveness of academic detailing on the use of 
ACE inhibitors and antidepressants.246 Although treating heart-failure 
patients with ACE inhibitors instead of selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs) yielded better health outcomes and a cost savings of 
$75 per patient,247 under the cost-benefit formula, implementing an 
academic detailing program to promote ACE inhibitors over SSRIs 
would not save enough money to justify the program’s start-up costs.248 
These results are misleading. According to clarifications set out in 
the study itself, the estimated costs for an academic detailing program to 
deliver information on one drug assumes divisibility of each detailer’s 
time and no scale effects.249 In other words, the cost-saving totals should 
be seen as indicative rather than definitive when deciding whether to 
implement an academic detailing program.250 For example, the formula 
assumed that policymakers would implement an academic detailing 
program to conduct educational outreach for one purpose—to utilize 
ACE inhibitors over SSRIs. The example failed to account for states 
utilizing academic detailing to change prescriber behavior for more than 
one drug.251 A different study showed that Pennsylvania’s academic 
detailing program reduced drug costs by $120 per doctor each month for 
a single class of drugs.252 Over the course of a year, cost savings could 
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potentially reach $572,000, or more than half of the original $1 million 
start-up cost.253 Pennsylvania’s program may not be cost-effective 
according to the above formula, but if the state found one more equally 
cost-effective drug to focus their detailing efforts on, the program’s net 
savings would surpass start-up costs in the first year.  
If state policymakers are concerned with academic detailing program 
start-up costs, states might consider a number of financing sources, 
including fees charged to manufacturers and labelers in the prescription 
drug industry, settlements from prescription-drug lawsuits, lottery funds, 
and federal grants.254 Maine, for example, obtains approximately 
$300,000 from manufacturers’ fees, funds from drug settlements, and a 
grant from AHRQ for the dissemination of comparative effectiveness 
research.255  
Private grants may also offset program costs. For example, the Idaho 
Medicaid Pharmacy Unit obtained a $50,000 grant in 2009 from The 
Prescription Project to support an academic detailing pilot program 
targeting prescribers of mental-health medications.256 There are several 
private organizations dedicated to providing nonbiased information on 
prescription drugs, including The Independent Drug Information Service, 
the Alosa Foundation, the Drug Effectiveness and Review Project, and the 
Pew Prescription Project.257 
Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to regulate the practice of de-
tailing itself to establish initial funding for academic detailing programs. 
For example, Washington, D.C. recently enacted legislation to regulate 
the practice of pharmaceutical detailing.258 Detailers operating in  
Washington, D.C. must obtain a detailing license or face a fine of up to 
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$10,000 or other sanctions.259 Additionally, they must obtain a biannual 
license, sign an affidavit swearing to a code of ethics, graduate from an 
institute of higher education, and pay application and licensure fees.260 
License renewal requires a minimum of fifteen hours of continuing educa-
tion every two years.261 Detailers must also maintain a record of their 
communications with licensed health professionals or their representatives 
for five years, including the name of the business; the date, time, and 
location of the contact; the products discussed; whether samples were 
provided; and the type of materials provided.262 Such regulations are not 
only another option for generating revenue for an academic detailing 
program but also more closely monitor the communications between 
detailers and prescribers.  
Georgia received federal assistance to establish an academic detailing 
program through ARRA grant funding.263 In September 2010, AHRQ 
awarded a three-year, $11.7 million contract to Total Therapeutic  
Management, a physician- and patient-education company in Georgia, to 
integrate the AHRQ’s comparative effectiveness tools through on-site 
visits with clinicians, nurses, health plan formularies, and other  
professionals.264 Georgia, however, is an outlier, as the federal government 
has not initiated academic detailing programs in any other state. 
States can also reduce program costs by learning from drug reps’ use 
of information technology in promoting drugs to physicians. As noted 
above, in 2005, the average primary care physician met with twenty-
eight drug reps each week for roughly two hours and fifteen minutes 
total.265 Because of the dramatic increase in the ratio of detailers to 
physicians, the cost of face-to-face detailing per physician rose more than 
31 percent between 2000 and 2004.266 According to one study, this was 
not due to a lack of drug reps employed by pharmaceutical companies, 
but rather a growing trend of physicians participating in electronic 
detailing (“e-detailing”), the promotion of pharmaceutical products using 
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an online channel and information technology as opposed to traditional, 
face-to-face detailing.267 Aside from increasing development of the 
internet, there are three reasons for the growth of e-detailing: (1) the 
falling effectiveness and increasing costs of employing pharmaceutical 
sales representatives to meet with physicians face-to-face, (2) increasing-
ly busier physicians with less time to meet with sales representatives, 
and (3) increased acceptance of the internet by physicians.268 Another 
possible reason for the growth of e-detailing, and the corresponding 
decrease in face-to-face detailing, may be the rapid increase in direct-to-
consumer pharmaceutical marketing.269 
Over time, e-detailing has progressed far beyond using the internet to 
detail drugs to physicians via e-mail. Today, pharmaceutical companies 
utilize e-detailing generally in one of two ways: virtual e-detailing, which is 
a taped or interactive presentation (such as a website) conveying a 
message to prescribers; or video e-detailing, which is face-to-face, personal 
computer-based video conferencing between a prescriber and a drug rep.270 
This latter type of e-detailing is more similar to traditional detailing and is 
one way for detailers to reach prescribers practicing in remote geographic 
areas or physicians who are not permitted to see representatives at their 
offices.271 
Studies on academic detailing show that face-to-face meetings with 
prescribers are the best approach to yield the highest cost savings.272 
However, face-to-face meetings may not always be feasible. For instance, 
detailers may find traversing the vast rural areas of Texas too time-
consuming or may be stymied by snowstorms in Vermont. To overcome 
these obstacles, academic detailing programs can use live or virtual  
e-detailing when a face-to-face relationship with the prescriber has 
already been established.273  
Efforts by the pharmaceutical industry to replace traditional detailing 
with e-detailing have been unsuccessful.274 Using e-detailing as a  
supplement to in-person academic detailing, however, may prove cost-
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effective and will help further implement educational outreach in remote 
geographic areas.275 
In sum, as shown in several states and studies, academic detailing can 
decrease prescription drug costs better than prescriber confidentiality laws. 
With several potential funding sources to minimize start-up costs, states 
can utilize academic detailing to save money by reducing the amount of 
unnecessary, brand-name prescription drugs prescribed to patients and 
utilizing e-detailing to supplement face-to-face interactions with  
prescribers.  
G. Promoting Public Health with Academic Detailing 
As the Court stated in Sorrell, prescription confidentiality laws  
banning the use of prescriber-identifying information will not advance a 
state’s interest in promoting public health.276 Academic detailing, however, 
can help prescribers pinpoint drugs that may endanger patient safety and 
can be substituted with alternative drugs with a proven safety history. As 
noted above, pharmaceutical detailers use prescriber-identifying data to 
locate early adopters of new prescription drugs, sometimes leading 
physicians to prescribe drugs without an established safety record.277  
Vioxx began as a success story in pharmaceutical marketing but 
ended in tragedy. First marketed in 1999, physicians prescribed Vioxx to 
more than 80 million patients.278 Over the course of five years, the FDA 
estimated that Vioxx caused 88,000–139,000 heart attacks.279 Although 
pharmaceutical companies work hard to promote new drugs quickly 
because of a “ticking patent clock” and competition among other brand-
name drugs, stories such as Vioxx suggest that a wait-and-see approach 
may better promote public health.280 Merck, the pharmaceutical  
company that created Vioxx, eventually withdrew the drug from the 
market in September 2004 due to safety issues.281 In November 2011, 
Merck agreed to pay $950 million and pled guilty to a criminal misde-
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meanor charge to resolve its illegal promotion of Vioxx to physicians and 
consumers.282 
In February 2005, Dr. David Graham produced a study comparing 
the risk of adverse cardiovascular events in patients taking Vioxx against 
patients taking Celebrex.283 According to the study, more than 27,700 
heart attacks and sudden cardiac deaths occurred between 1999 and 
2003 that could have been avoided.284 Taking 25 milligrams per day or 
more of Vioxx resulted in more than three times the risk of acute heart 
attacks or sudden cardiac death compared with patients using  
Celebrex.285 If academic detailers provided prescribers additional scien-
tific, evidence-based information about Vioxx, some of these adverse 
health outcomes may have been mitigated.  
In addition to focusing efforts on a particular drug, existing academic 
detailing programs also focus on particular ailments or diseases for which 
physicians can make better-informed prescribing decisions to promote 
public health.286 Focusing on a specific drug or disease allows academic 
detailers to better tailor messages to prescribers.287 For instance, in 
Pennsylvania’s academic detailing program, detailers focus their efforts on 
diseases typically treated with proton pump inhibitors, antihypertensive 
drugs, antiplatelet therapy, lipid-lowering drugs, and COX-2  
inhibitors/non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.288 Detailers in  
Washington, D.C. focus on diabetes and antiplatelet therapy,289 South 
Carolina’s academic detailing program focuses on mental health within the 
Medicaid program,290 and Maine focuses on diabetes and antiplatelet 
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therapy.291 Each of these programs found that focusing efforts on specific 
problem areas, as opposed to providing prescribers with an abundance of 
drug safety information all at once, improved the effectiveness of  
education outreach visits.292 
Academic detailing can promote public health more effectively than the 
prescription confidentiality laws enacted by Maine, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont. By providing non-biased, evidence-based information on  
prescription drugs to prescribers, states will be able to increase prescriptions 
for appropriate drugs, decrease prescriptions for inappropriate drugs, and 
prevent disease and other adverse medical events. 
H. Prescriber-Identifying Data Can Improve Academic Detailing 
Like pharmaceutical companies, academic detailing programs can use 
prescriber-identifying data to locate “early adopters” and other physicians 
who can benefit from evidence-based information on the drugs they are 
prescribing. Before the Supreme Court ruled against it in Sorrell,  
Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law set aside funding for an 
academic detailing program that used prescriber-identifiable data to 
promote the use of generics in place of brand-name drugs.293 However, 
states could use prescriber-identifying data to aid academic detailing 
programs in several other ways. For example, states could use this 
information to locate physicians who treat certain cardiologic ailments to 
supply them with information on the benefits of medications designed to 
improve heart health.294 Alternatively, if a state learns about the adverse 
side effects of certain medications, the state’s academic detailing program 
could then use prescriber-identifying data to locate prescribers most in 
need of safety information on those problematic medications.295 States  
may view prescriber-identifying data solely as a means for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to better detail brand-name drugs to prescribers. However, 
states should also be aware of the several ways that this information can 
aid academic detailers in promoting public health and decreasing prescrip-
tion drug costs.  
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Conclusion 
Pharmaceutical detailing can increase prescription drug costs and 
worsen patients’ health outcomes. Pharmaceutical companies’ use of 
prescriber-identifying data undoubtedly magnifies these problems. 
However, suppressing the free flow of prescriber-identifying data to HIOs 
and pharmaceutical manufacturers will not solve these problems. 
Furthermore, crafting legislation according to the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Sorrell will result only in prescription confidentiality laws 
that hinder other parties, such as medical researchers, from accessing the 
same information. That result would run counter one of the most 
important reasons for enacting prescription confidentiality laws—
promoting public health.  
Academic detailers cannot stop pharmaceutical detailers from visit-
ing physician offices, but they can remind physicians of their ability to 
opt out of sharing their prescriber-identifying data through the PDRP. 
Physicians will likely prescribe fewer expensive, brand-name drugs if 
academic detailers inform them of an equally effective, medically 
appropriate drug that may be cheaper for patients. 
Academic detailing helps states protect physician privacy, decreases 
prescription drug costs, and promotes public health better than prescrip-
tion confidentiality laws. Furthermore, academic detailing will not 
hinder medical researchers or public health programs from obtaining 
valuable information from HIOs. At a time when unlimited amounts of 
data can decrease healthcare costs and increase productivity, and in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell, state legislators should 
implement policies supporting academic detailing programs and refrain 
from enacting prescription confidentiality laws banning the use of 
prescriber-identifying data. 
 
